In this work, we study the problem of partial key exposure. Standard cryptographic definitions and constructions do not guarantee any security even if a tiny fraction of the secret key is compromised. We show how to build cryptographic primitives, in the standard model (without random oracles), that remain secure even when an adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key. We accomplish this by giving constructions for the All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT), introduced by Rivest. An AONT is an efficiently computable transform Ì on strings such that:
Introduction
A great deal of cryptography can be seen as finding ways to leverage the possession of a small but totally secret piece of knowledge (a key) into the ability to perform many useful and complex actions: from encryption and decryption to identification and message authentication. But what happens if our most basic assumption breaks down -that is, if the secrecy of our key becomes partially compromised?
It has been noted that key exposure is one of the greatest threats to security in practice [1] . Indeed, at the recent Rump session of CRYPTO '98, Nicko van Someren [25] illustrated a breathtakingly simple attack by which keys stored in the memory of a computer could be identified and extracted, by looking for regions of memory showing high entropy. Within weeks of the appearance of the followup paper [24] , a new generation of computer viruses emerged that tried to use these ideas to steal secret keys [9] . Shamir and van Someren gave some heuristic suggestions on preventing these kinds of attacks, such as having software "spread a key among different memory locations" in order to avoid being found. While such measures help to ensure that attackers will not recover the entire secret key, they do not solve the problem of partial exposure.
Unfortunately, standard cryptographic definitions and constructions cannot guarantee security even if a tiny fraction of the secret key is exposed. In this work, we show how to build cryptographic primitives, in the standard model (without random oracles) and using general computational assumptions, that remain provably secure even when the adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key. Our techniques also have several applications in other settings.
Previous approaches and our goals. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [23, 4] , and protection using specialized hardware. Instantiations of the key distribution paradigm include threshold cryptosystems [8] and proactive cryptosystems [14] . Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not realistic for the average user. Another widely considered proposal is the use of specially protected hardware such as smartcards, which can also be costly, inconvenient, or inapplicable to many contexts. Thus, the cost or inconvenience of such solutions may make them prohibitive for many applications; some users simply may not have the luxury to afford the investment such solutions would require.
Instead, we seek to enable a single user to protect itself against partial key exposure on a single machine. A natural idea would be to use a secret sharing scheme to split the key into shares, and then attempt to provide protection by storing these shares instead of storing the secret key directly. However, secret sharing schemes only guarantee security if the adversary misses at least one share in its entirety. Unfortunately, each share must be fairly large (about as long as the security parameter). Thus, in essence we return to our original problem: even if an adversary only learns a small fraction of all the bits, it could be that it learns a few bits from each of the shares, and hence the safety of the secret can no longer be guaranteed. We would like to do better 1 .
The All-Or-Nothing Transform. Recently Rivest [22] , motivated by different security concerns arising in the context of block ciphers, introduced an intriguing primitive called the All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT). An AONT 2 is an efficiently computable transformation Ì on strings such that:
For any string Ü, given all of Ì´Üµ, one can efficiently recover Ü. 1 Indeed, our techniques can be seen as yielding, for certain parameters, highly efficient "gap" analogues of computational secret sharing schemes [17] , where the share size can be small as ½ bit! See Remark 5.5. 2 Here we informally present a refinement of the definition due to Boyko [5] .
¯There exists some threshold such that any polynomial-time adversary that (adaptively) learns all but bits of Ì´Üµ obtains no information about Ü (in a computational sense).
The AONT solves the problem of partial key exposure: Rather than storing a secret key directly, we store the AONT applied to the secret key. If we can build an AONT where the threshold value is very small compared to the size of the output of the AONT, we obtain security against almost total exposure. Notice that this methodology applies to secret keys with arbitrary structure, and thus protects all kinds of cryptographic systems. One can also consider AONT's that have a two-part output: a public output that doesn't need to be protected, and a secret output that has the exposure-resilience property stated above. Such a notion would also provide the kind of protection we seek to achieve. The AONT has many other applications, as well, such as enhancing the security of block-ciphers and making fixed-blocksize encryption schemes more efficient [16] . For an excellent exposition on these and other applications of the AONT, see [5] .
Our Results: Until now, the only known construction of an AONT 3 with provable security was given by Boyko [5] in the random oracle model, who showed that Bellare and Rogaway's Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [2] yields an AONT. In this work, we give the first constructions for AONT's with essentially optimal resilience in the standard model, based only on computational assumptions. The key to our approach and our main conceptual contribution is the notion of an Exposure-Resilient Function (ERF) -a deterministic function whose output appears random even if almost all the bits of the input are revealed. We believe this notion is both very useful and interesting in its own right. Consider for example an ERF with an output that is longer than its input -this can be seen a particularly strong kind of pseudorandom generator, where the generator's output remains pseudorandom even if most of the seed is known. We show that ERF's provide a solution to the partial key exposure problem for many settings in private-key cryptography, where the secret key need only be a pseudorandom string.
More specifically, our results are:
We show how to construct, from any one-way function, for any¯ ¼, an ERF mapping an input of Ò bits to an output of any size polynomial in Ò, such that as long as any Ò¯bits of the input remain unknown, the output will be pseudorandom. We give examples of how to use ERF's directly to address key exposure problems in private key cryptography; most notably we show how to solve what we call the gradual key exposure problem, where an adversary is able to learn more and more bits of a shared secret key over time.
We give a simple construction of an AONT based on any ERF. For any¯ ¼, we show how to achieve a resilience threshold of AE¯, where AE is the size of the output of the AONT. If viewed as an AONT with separate public and secret outputs, then the size of the output of the AONT can be made optimal, as well.
We also show that the existence of an AONT with ½, where is the size of the input, implies the existence of one-way functions. We show that this result is tight up to a constant factor by constructing an unconditionally secure AONT with ¢´ µ using no assumptions.
We also give another construction of an AONT based on any function such that both Ü ´Üµ℄ and Ü ´Üµ¨Ü℄ are ERF's. This construction is similar to the OAEP, and so our analysis makes a step towards abstracting the properties of the random oracle needed to make the OAEP work as an AONT. It also has the advantage of meeting the standard definition of an AONT (without separate public and secret outputs) while retaining a relatively short output length.
Finally, we show that a weaker "average-case" definition of AONT is equivalent to the standard "worst-case" definition of AONT, by giving an efficient transformation that achieves this goal.
Previous Work: Chor et al. [7] considered a notion called a Ø-resilient function, which are related to our notion of an Exposure-Resilient Function (ERF). A Ø-resilient function is a function whose output is truly random even if an adversary can fix any Ø of the inputs to the function. This turns out to be equivalent to the strongest formulation of unconditional security for an ERF. We give constructions for statistical unconditionally secure ERF's that beat the impossibility results given in [7] , by achieving an output distribution that is not truly random, but rather exponentially close in statistical deviation from truly random. Work on privacy amplification in unconditionally secure key agreement protocols is also related to our work (see e.g. [3, 6] ). Bellare and Miner [1] consider the notion of forward-security for signature schemes, which is a different attempt to address the key exposure problem. The kind of security they achieve prevents an adversary that gains a current secret key from being able to forge signatures on messages "dated" in the past. A similar notion of security can be defined for encryption, where a compromised current secret key would not enable an adversary to decrypt messages sent in the past. In contrast, our work deals with providing security for both the future as well as the past, but assuming that not all of the secret key is compromised. In Section 4.4, we also address the problem of gradual key exposure, where no a priori bound on the amount of information the adversary obtains is assumed, rather we assume only a bound on the rate at which that the adversary gains information.
Organization:
In Section 2 we briefly define some preliminaries. Section 3 defines our main notions of Exposure-Resilient Functions and All-Or-Nothing Transforms. Section 4 talks in detail about constructions and application of ERF's, while Section 5 is concentrated with constructing and examining the properties of AONT's. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs and discussion are left to Appendices.
Preliminaries
For a randomized algorithm and an input Ü, we denote by ´Üµ the output distribution of on Ü, and by ´Ü Öµ we denote the output string when using the randomness Ö. If one of the inputs to is considered a "key", then we write it as a subscript (e.g., ×´Ü µ). In this paper we will not optimize certain constant factors which are not of conceptual importance. Unless otherwise specified, we will consider security against nonuniform adversaries. Note that all the proofs of security can be made to work with uniform adversaries as well, with appropriate standard modifications to the definitions and proofs.
Let Ò denote the set of element subsets of Ò℄ ½ Ò , and for Ä ¾ Ò , Ý ¾ ¼ ½ Ò , let Ý℄ Ä denote Ý restricted to its´Ò µ bits not in Ä. We denote by¨the bit-wise exclusive OR operator.
We recall that that statistical difference (also called statistical distance) between two random variables and on a finite set is defined to be
Indistinguishability
Given two distributions and , we denote by ( ¯ , ) the fact that they are computationally (statistically within¯, perfectly) indistinguishable. For the case of statistical closeness, we will always have that¯is negligible in an appropriate security parameter. When the statement can hold for any of the above choices (or the choice is clear from the context), we will simply write . We need the following lemma whose proof can be found in Appendix A. The proof of the next simple lemma is straightforward and is omitted.
Lemma 2.2 Let be polynomial time computable function and
b) assume is independent from both and ¼ , and is some function. Then
We call ´ µ sufficient statistics.
Definitions
In this section, we define the central concepts in our paper: Exposure-Resilient Functions (ERF's) and All-Or-Nothing Transforms (AONT's). An ERF is a function such that if its input is chosen at random, and an adversary learns all but bits of the input, for some threshold value , then the output of the function will still appear pseudorandom to the adversary. Formally, The definition states that an ERF transforms Ò random bits into (pseudo-)random bits, such that even learning all but bits of the input leaves the output indistinguishable from a random value. There are several parameters of interest here: , Ò, and . We see that the smaller is, the harder is to satisfy the condition above, since fewer bits are left unknown to the adversary. However, is not the only parameter of interest, it is both Ò and that tell us how "exposure-resilient" is the ERF for a given . For example, saying that ¯d oes not mean much on its own. It could be that Ò , and the function in this case has no exposure-resilience properties. Generally, there are two measures of interest: the fraction of with respect to Ò, which we would like to be as small as possible (this shows the "resilience"); and the size of with respect to , which we want to be as large as possible (this shows how many pseudorandom bits we obtain compared to the number of random bits the adversary cannot see).
We now define the notion of an AONT: 
In other words, the random variables in Ì´Üµ℄ Ä Ü ¾ ¼ ½ are all indistinguishable from each other. Here can refer to perfect, statistical or computational indistinguishability.
Remark 3.4 Note again, as in Remark 3.2, that the definition given here is a "non-adaptive" definition. We stress that all our constructions satisfy the corresponding adaptive definition, as well.
The definition given above is the natural analogue of the formal definition of AONT given by Boyko [5] (refining an earlier definition of Rivest [22] ) in a setting with a random oracle 4 . We also consider a generalization of this notion, which we call an AONT with secret and public outputs. In this case, we consider an AONT where the output Ý is divided in two sections: a secret part Ý ½ and a public part Ý ¾ .
The public part of the output is such that it requires no protection -that is, it can revealed to the adversary in full. It is only secret part Ý ½ that requires some protection. The security guarantee now states that as long as bits of the secret output Ý ½ remain hidden (while all the bits of Ý ¾ can be revealed), the adversary should have no information about the message. Note that clearly, this generalized notion solves the problem of partial key exposure as well (and also remains equally applicable to all the other known uses of the AONT). This generalized form allows us to characterize the security of our constructions more precisely. For a more detailed discussion of this notion, see Appendix B. Formally, the definition of -AONT remains as above with the following simple modification: Now we have AE × · Ô, and Ì´Üµ outputs a pair Ý ´Ý ½ Ý ¾ µ where Ý ½ ¾ ¼ ½ × and Ý ¾ ¾ ¼ ½ Ô . Finally, the security holds for all Ä ¾ × rather than Ä ¾ AE (observe that notationally, Ý℄ Ä ´ Ý ½ ℄ Ä Ý ¾ µ).
Everything else remains the same. The standard definition corresponds to the case where the public output is of size ¼ (i.e. Ô ¼, × AE). We call such AONT's secret-only.
The above definition is "indistinguishability" based. As usual, one can make the equivalent "semantic security" based definition, where the adversary, given Þ Ì´Üµ℄ Ä (where Ü is picked according to some distribution Å), cannot compute ¬ satisfying some relation Ê´Ü ¬µ "significantly better" than without Þ at all. The proof of equivalence is standard and is omitted. Thus, the all-or-nothing transforms allow one to "encode" any Ü in such a form that the encoding is easily invertible, and yet, an adversary learning all but bits of the (secret part of the) encoding "cannot extract any useful" information about Ü.
Boyko [5] showed that assuming the existence of a random oracle, the following so called "optimal asymmetric encryption padding" (OAEP) construction is an -AONT (where can be chosen to be logarithmic in the security parameter). Let 
Exposure-Resilient Functions (ERF)
In this section we give constructions and some applications of exposure-resilient functions (ERF's). First, we describe perfect ERF's and their limitations. Then, on our way to building computational ERF's with very strong parameters, we first build statistical ERF's, and achieve essentially the best possible parameters. Finally we show how to combine this construction with standard pseudorandom generators (PRG) to construct computational ERF's based on any one-way function (OWF) that achieve any ª´Ò¯µ and any ÔÓÐÝ´Òµ (in fact, such ERF's are equivalent to the existence of one-way functions).
We conclude by giving several applications of ERF's.
Perfect ERF
Here we require that Ö℄ Ä ´Öµ Ö℄ Ä Ê . Since the distributions are identical, this is equivalent to saying that no matter how one sets any´Ò µ bits of Ö (i.e. sets Ö℄ Ä ), as long as the remaining Ö bits are set at random, the output ´Öµ is still perfectly uniform over ¼ ½ . This turns out to be exactly the notion of so called´Ò µ-resilient functions considered in [7] . As an example, if ½, exclusive OR of Ò input bits is a trivial perfect ½-ERF (or a´Ò ½µ-resilient function).
We observe that perfect -ERF can potentially exist only for . Optimistically, we might expect to indeed achieve Ç´ µ. However, already for ¾ Chor et al [7] show that we must have Ò ¿, i.e. at least third of the input should remain secret in order to get just ¾ random bits! On the positive side, for Ò ¾, using binary linear error correcting codes one can construct perfect -ERF.For a sketch of the proof of the following theorem and discussion of its implications (along with some background on error correcting codes), see Appendix C. 
Statistical ERF
We saw that perfect ERF cannot achieve Ò ¿. Breaking this barrier will be crucial in achieving the level of security we ultimately desire from (computational) ERF's. In this section, we show that by relaxing the requirement only slightly to allow negligible (in fact exponentially small) statistical deviation, we are able to obtain ERF's for essentially any value of (with respect to Ò) such that we obtain an output size ¢´ µ. Note that this is the best we can hope for up to constant factors, since it is not possible to have for any ERF with statistical deviation¯ ½ ¾ (proof is obvious, and omitted).
The key ingredient in our construction will be a combinatorial object called a strong extractor. An extractor is a family of hash functions À such that when a function is chosen at random from À, and is applied to a random variable that has "enough randomness" in it, the resulting random variable ´ µ is statistically close to the uniform distribution. In other words, by investing enough true randomness, namely the amount needed to select a random member of À, one can "extract" from a distribution statistically close to the uniform distribution. A strong extractor has an extra property that is close to the uniform distribution even when the random function is revealed. (Perhaps the best known example of a strong extractor is given in the Leftover Hash Lemma of [15] , where standard 2-universal hash families are shown to be strong extractors.) Much work has been done in developing this area (e.g. [12, 26, 28, 21] ). In particular, it turns out that one can extract almost all the randomness in by investing very few truly random bits (i.e. having small À). For more information on these topics, see the excellent survey article of Nisan [20] .
The intuition behind our construction is as follows: Notice that after the adversary observes´Ò µ bits of the input (no matter how it chose those bits), the input can still be any of the ¾ completions of the input with equal probability. In other words, conditioned on any observation made by the adversary, the probability of any particular string being the input is at most ¾ . Thus, if we apply a sufficiently good extractor to the input, we have a chance to extract ª´ µ bits statistically close to uniform -exactly what we need. The problem is that we need some small amount of true randomness to select the hash function in the extractor family. However, if this randomness is small enough (say, at most ¾ bits), we can take it from the input itself. Hence, we view the first ¾ bits of Ö (which we will call Ù) as the randomness used to select the hash function , and the rest of Ö we call Ú. The output of our function will be ´Úµ. Then even observing Ù and´Ò µ other bits of Ö leaves at least ¾ ¾ equally likely possible values of Ö (since Ù ¾). Now, provided our extractor is good enough, we indeed obtain ª´ µ bits statistically close to uniform.
A few important remarks are in place before we give precise parameters. First, the adversary may choose to learn the entire Ù (i.e. it knows ). This is not a problem since we are using a strong extractor,
i.e. the output is random even if one knows the true randomness used. Secondly, unlike the perfect ERF setting, where it was equivalent to let the adversary set´Ò µ input bits in any manner it wants, here the entire input (including Ù) must be chosen uniformly at random (and then possibly observed by the adversary).
Our most important requirement is that the hash function in the strong extractor be describable by a very short random string. This requirement is met by the strong extractor of Srinivasan and Zuckerman [26] using the hash families of Naor and Naor [19] . Their results can be interpreted as giving the following lemma: 
Computational ERF
In the statistical construction given in the previous section, we were able to achieve essentially all the security against partial key exposure we wanted. The only thing limiting the applicability of the statistical construction is that the output size is limited to . We would like to be able to achieve an arbitrary output size. By finally relaxing our requirement to computational security, we can easily accomplish this goal by using a pseudorandom generator as the final outermost layer of our construction. We also show that any ERF with implies the existence of pseudoranom generators, closing the loop. Finally, we show a "converse", i.e. that computational ERF's with imply the existence of pseudorandom generators (and hence, one-way functions).
Lemma 4.8 If there exists an -ERF mapping ¼ ½ Ò to ¼ ½ , for (for infinitely many different values of Ò ), then one-way functions exist.
Proof: We simply observe that the hypothesis implies the existence of the ensemble of distributions (we hide the obvious parametrization):
Ö℄ Ä ´Öµ and Ö℄ Ä Ê , where Ê is uniform on ¼ ½ . By assumption, and are computationally indistinguishable ensembles. Note that can have at most Ò bits of entropy (since the only source of randomness is Ö), while has Ò · Ò ·½ bits of entropy. Thus, the statistical difference between and is at least ½ ¾. By the result of Goldreich [11] , the existence of a pair of efficiently samplable distributions that are computationally indistinguishable but statistically far apart implies the existence of pseudorandom generators, and hence one-way functions.
As an immediate corollary, we get 
The existence of one-way functions.
A particularly useful kind of -ERF will be a length-preserving 
Applications of ERF
As we said, -ERF ¼ ½ Ò ¼ ½ allows one to represent a random secret in an "exposureresilient" way. In Section 5 we show how to construct AONT's using ERF's. Here we give some other examples.
As an immediate example, especially when Ò, it allows us to obtain a much stronger form of pseudorandom generator, which not only stretches Ò bits to bits, but remains pseudorandom when aný Ò µ bits of the seed are revealed. As a natural extension of the above example, we can apply it to private-key cryptography. A classical one-time private key encryption scheme over ¼ ½ chooses a random shared secret key Ö ¾ ¼ ½ Ò and encrypts Ü ¾ ¼ ½ by the pseudorandom "one-time pad" ´Öµ (where is a PRG), i.e. ´Ü Öµ Ü¨ ´Öµ. We can make it resilient to the partial key exposure by replacing PRG with ERF . For the next few examples, we assume for convenience that ERF
¼ ½ ¼ ½ is length-
preserving. Using such , we show how to obtain exposure-resilient form of a pseudorandom function family (PRF). A PRF family × × ¾ ¼ ½ has the property that × is indistinguishable from a random function when the seed × is chosen at random from ¼ ½ , but the pseudorandomness is only guaranteed if × is completely hidden. Defining × ´×µ , we get a new pseudorandom function family × × ¾ ¼ ½ , which remains pseudorandom even when all but bits of the seed × are known.
We call such family an exposure-resilient PRF. We appply this again to private-key cryptography. The classical private-key encryption scheme selects a random shared key × ¾ ¼ ½ and encrypts Ü by a pair Ü¨ ×´Ê µ Ê , where
and Ê is chosen at random. Again, replacing by an exposure-resilient PRF, we obtain resilience against partial key exposure. Here, our secret key is × ¾ ¼ ½ , but ´×µ is used as the index to a regular PRF.
In fact, we can achieve security even against what we call the gradual key exposure problem in the setting with random private keys. Namely, consider a situation where the adversary is able to learn more and more bits of the secret key over time. Here, we do not place any upper bound on the amount of information that the adversary can learn about the secret key, but instead assume only that the rate at which the adversary can gain information is bounded. For example, suppose that every week the adversary somehow learns at most bits of our secret Ö. We know that as long as the adversary misses bits of Ö, the system is secure 5 . However, if our key is relatively short, pretty soon there is a danger that the adversary knows more than bits of Ö, so the system is no longer secure. We argue that we can avoid this, provided the rate the adversary learns our secret is not too large. Namely, both parties periodically (say with period slightly less than´ µ weeks), update our key by setting Ö Ò Û ´Ö ÓÐ µ. Since at the time of each update, the adversary missed at least bits of our current key Ö, the value ´Öµ is still pseudorandom, and thus secure. Hence, we can agree on the secret key only once, even if the adversary continuously learns more and more of our secret!
All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT)
As we pointed out, no AONT constructions without random oracles are known. We give several such constructions. One of our constructions implies that for the interesting settings of parameters, the existence of -AONT's, -ERF's and one-way functions are equivalent. The other construction can be viewed as the special case of the OAEP contruction of Bellare and Rogaway [2] . Thus, our result can be viewed as the first step towards abstracting the properties of the random oracle that suffice for this construction to work. Finally, we give a "worst-case/average-case" reduction for AONT's that shows that one only needs to check the definition of AONT for random Ü ¼ Ü ½ .
Simple Construction using ERF
We view the process of creating -AONT as that of one-time private-key encryption, similarly to the application in Section 4.4. Namely, we look at the simplest possible one-time private key encryption scheme -the one-time pad, which is unconditionally secure. Here the secret key is a random string Ê of length , and the encryption of Ü ¾ ¼ ½ is just Ü¨Ê. We simply replace Ê by ´Öµ where is -ERF and Ö is our new secret. We get We conclude with a remark about the applicability of AONT's as certain kinds of computational secret sharing schemes. 
AONT implies OWFs Theorem 5.6 Assume we have a computational -AONT
Ì ¼ ½ ¼ ½ × ¢ ¼ ½ Ô ¼ ½ AE where
½. Then one-way functions exist.
Proof: To show that OWF's exist it is sufficient to show that weak OWF's exist [10] . Fix Ä ℄ ×℄. Define ´Ü ¼ Ü ½ Öµ Ü ¼ Ü ½ Ý℄ Ä , where Ý Ì´Ü Öµ. We claim that is a weak OWF.
Assume not. Then there is an inverter such that when Ü ¼ Ü ½ Ö are chosen at random, Ý Ì´Ü Öµ, Þ Ý℄ Ä , Ö ´Ü ¼ Ü ½ Þµ, Ý Ì´Ü Öµ, Þ Ý℄ Ä , we have ÈÖ´Þ Þµ ¿ .
To show that there exist Ü ¼ Ü ½ breaking the indistinguishability property of Ì , we construct a distinguisher for Ì that has non-negligible advantage for random Ü ¼ Ü ½ ¾ ¼ ½ . This would show that the required Ü ¼ Ü ½ exist. Hence, the job of is the following. Ü ¼ , Ü ½ , , Ö are chosen at random, and we set Ý Ì´Ü Öµ, Þ Ý℄ Ä . Then is given the challenge Þ together with Ü ¼ and Ü ½ . Now, has to predict correctly with probability non-negligibly more than ½ ¾. We let run ´Ü ¼ Ü ½ Þµ to get Ö. Now, sets Ý Ì´Ü Öµ, Þ Ý℄ Ä . If indeed Þ Þ (i.e. succedeed), outputs as its guess, else it flips a coin.
Let be the event that succeeds inverting. From the way we set up the experiment, we know that
happen and succeeded inverting, we know that , as it is ½ is an impossible answer. Thus, using ÈÖ´ µ ÈÖ´ µ ÈÖ´ µ, we get:
To get a contradiction, we show that ÈÖ´Íµ ¾ , which is at most ½ ¿ since ½. To show this, we observe that Í measures the probability of the event that when we choose Ü Ü ¼ Ö at random and set Þ Ì´Ü Öµ℄ Ä , what is the probability that there is Ö ¼ such that Þ Ì´Ü ¼ Ö ¼ µ℄ Ä . However, for any fixed setting of Þ, there are only ¾ possible completions Ý ¾ ¼ ½ AE . And for each such completion Ý, invertability of Ì implies that there could be at most one Ü ¼ ¾ Ì ½´Ý µ. Hence, for any setting of Þ, at most ¾ out of ¾ possible Ü ¼ have a chance to have the corresponding Ö ¼ . Thus, ÈÖ´Íµ ¾ indeed.
Up to a constant factor, the result is optimal, since one can achieve statistical (even secret-only) -AONT with Ç´ µ. Indeed, we use statistical -ERF ¼ ½ Ò ¼ ½ with Ç´ µ (and any 
Towards secret-only AONT
We also give another construction of an AONT based on any length-preserving function such that both Ö ´Öµ℄ and Ö ´Öµ¨Ö℄ are ERF's. This construction can be viewed as a special case of the OAEP construction as defined by Equations (3)-(4) (but without random oracles). Thus, our analysis makes a step towards abstracting the properties of the random oracle needed to make the OAEP work as an AONT. It also has the advantage of meeting the standard definition of an AONT (without separate public and secret outputs), while retaining a relatively short output length.
Recall The proof and the related discussion can be found in Appendix D. We note, though, that random oracle clearly satisfies the conditions of the Theorem. Thus, we obtained a simple proof that even removing random oracle À leaves the OAEP construction secure for Ò . We believe that the assumption of the theorem is quite reasonable, even though we leave open the question of constructing such based on standard assumptions.
Worst-case / Average-case Equivalence of AONT
In the definition of AONT we require that Equation (2) holds for any Ü ¼ , Ü ½ . This implies (and is equivalent) to saying that it holds if one is to choose Ü ¼ Ü ½ according to any distribution Ô´Ü ¼ Ü ½ µ. A natural such distribution is the uniform distribution, which selects random Ü ¼ Ü ½ uniformly and independently from ¼ ½ . We call an AONT secure against (possibly only) the uniform distribution an average-case AONT. A natural question to ask is whether average-case AONT implies (regular) AONT with comparable parameters, which can be viewed as the worst-case/average case equivalence. We show that up to a constant factor, the notions are indeed identical in the statistical or computational settings. Below we assume without loss of generality that our domain is a finite field (e.g. ´¾ µ), so that addition and multiplication are defined. 
In the above output, we separately concatenate secret and public parts of Ì 's output.
Proof: See Appendix E

Conclusions
We have studied the problem of partial key exposure and related questions. We have proposed solutions to these problems based on new constructions of the All-Or-Nothing Transform in the standard model based on any one-way function, without random oracles.
The key ingredient in our approach is an interesting new primitive which we call an ExposureResilient Function. This primitive has natural applications in combatting key exposure, and we believe it is also interesting in its own right. We showed how to build essentially optimal ERF's based on any one-way function. We also explored many other interesting properties of ERF's and AONT's. Proof: We use the formula that for any events and , ÈÖ´ µ · ÈÖ´ µ ÈÖ´ µ.
A Proof of
We now prove Lemma 2.1, which stated the following: Let and be any two random variables.
Let Ê be chosen uniformly at random and be chosen according to a distribution Ô, both independently from and . Then the following are equivalent:
(1)
¨ , for any polynomial time sampleable (PTS) distribution Ô.
¨ , for uniform Ô. 
B Discussion of AONT with Secret and Public Outputs
We now discuss the generalized definition of AONT. Recall that the standard definition requires that security should hold for any -element subset Ä of AE℄. The interpretation is that we wish to protect the secret Ü, we encode secret Ü into a new secret Ý Ì´Üµ such that Ü is protected against the adversary learning all but bits of Ý. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that all parts of the transform are "equally important" and should have the same protection against the attacker. In reality, different parts of the transform serve different purposes for the decoding process. Some of them could be used just for the decoding process (so that the mapping is invertible), but are not important to keep secret against the attacker, while others are really the ones that do all the cryptographic work, and thus, should be kept secret.
For example, we could have a transform of output length ¾ , where, as long as the adversary does not learn Ô bits from the second half of the transform, we are completely secure, but are totally insecure if it learns the entire second half. This seems like a very reasonable solution to the key leakage problem; we will simply protect as hard as we can the second half of the transform, while the first part we might as well publish. However, in the standard setting we must set · Ô to ensure that the adversary misses at least Ô bits of the second half. This seems to be an artificial setting for , indicating that more than half of the transform should be kept hidden. Common sense tells us that the real answer is Ô , because first and second half serve different purposes, and we are secure as long as Ô bits of the second half remain hidden.
This leads us to the following more general notion of AONT. Here we can encode Ü into a "secret" part Ý ½ and a "public" part Ý ¾ , such that the public part might as well be published, while the secret part has our standard resilience property. Namely, the adversary learning all but bits of Ý ½ (and the entire public Ý ¾ ) cannot learn anything useful about Ü. Thus, public part is only used to decode Ü back (in conjunction with the secret part), but we really do not care about protecting it. It is the secret part Ý ½ that is important to protect.
iii We argue that this generalized notion allow us more flexibility than before. First of all, it allows reasonable AONT constructions, as in the example above, to have small , as they should. Secondly, while without the public part, the size of the secret part had to be at least the size of the message, now it can be much smaller (at the expense of the public part). Thus, the public part may be stored on some insecure device with fast access time (like public cache), while secret part may be stored further away in some publically read-protected memory (and still give a guarantee that small accidental leakage will not compromise the security). In addition, we will see that more general AONT's (with the public part) seem to be more efficient and much easier to construct than the corresponding AONT's with secret part only. We also point out that this generalized notion of AONT naturally suffices for all applications of AONT we are aware of.
C Error Correcting Codes and Perfect ERF
A binary linear Ò ℄ error-correcting code can be seen as a linear transformation from ¼ ½ to ¼ ½ Ò (where these are viewed as vector spaces over ´¾µ). Thus, such a code can be described by an ¢ Ò generating matrix Å over ´¾µ. For any vector Ú ¾ ¼ ½ , the codeword corresponding to Ú is ÚÅ. A code is said to have minimum distance if for every two distinct vectors Ù Ú ¾ ¼ ½ , ÙÅ and ÚÅ differ on at least coordinates. Note that by linearity, this is equivalent to requiring that every non-zero codeword has at least non-zero components. For further information on error correcting codes, as well as for proofs of the results on error correcting codes that we use, see [18] . The proof of this theorem follows by observing that every codeword is a linear combination of the rows of Å (since codewords are of the form ÙÅ for Ù ¾ ¼ ½ ). The distance properties of the code imply that the rows of Å are linearly independent, and furthermore that every non-trivial linear combination of the rows creates a codeword of Hamming weight at least . Hence, even after removing any´ ½µ ´Ò µ columns of Å, the resulting rows of Å are still linearly independent, which gives the desired result.
We apply this result to a special kind of code. A code is said to be asymptotically good if Ò Ç´ µ and ª´Òµ (i.e., the three parameters Ò, , and differ by multiplicative constants). Many explicit constructions for asymptotically good codes (e.g. the Justesen code) also exist. Using such a code, we can get both Ò and Ò to be (very small) constants.
Note that for any code, Ò · ½ (this is called the singleton bound). Thus, we have Ò ´Ò · ½µ · ½ , as expected. Also, it is known that Ò ¾ for ¾ ÐÓ Ò. This implies that we are limited to have Ò ¾. However, at the expense of making Ò ÔÓÐÝ´ µ, using a Reed-Solomon code concatenated with a Hadamard code, we can achieve Ò · ½ to be arbitrarily close to Ò ¾, but can never cross it.
D Discussion and Proofs for Section 5.3
Recall that the OAEP construction sets Ì´Ü Öµ Ù Ø , where Ù ´Öµ¨Ü, Ø À´Ùµ¨Ö, and ¼ ½ Ò ¼ ½ and À ¼ ½ ¼ ½ Ò are some functions (e.g., random oracles). Let's try to develop some informal intuition of why this construction works; in particular, to separate the properties of and À that are essential (and hopefully sufficient) for this construction to be an AONT. We look at the two extreme cases.
iv First, assume we know Ù and miss bits of Ø. Then we miss bits of Ö, since Ö À´Ùµ¨Ø. Note that Ü ´Öµ¨Ù, so in order to "miss Ü completely", must have the property that missing bits of 's random input Ö makes the output pseudorandom (random oracle clearly satisfies this). But this is exactly the notion of -ERF! Thus, must be an ERF, and this suffices to handle the case when we miss bits of Ø.
Now assume that we know Ø and are missing bits of Ù. Assume for a second that À is a random oracle. Then, since Ö À´Ùµ¨Ø, we are essentially missing Ö completely. But from the previous argument about , we know that even missing bits of Ö leaves Ü completely unknown. Thus, random oracle À achieves even more than we need. In some sense, as long as À does not "unhide" information we miss about Ù, we will miss at least bits of Ö. In other words, assume À satisfies the property that missing of its input bits implies "missing" at least of its output bits. Then missing bits of Ù implies missing bits of Ö, which implies missing entire ´Öµ, which implies missing Ü completely. So we ask the question of which À satisfy this property? Clearly, the easiest one is the identity function (assuming Ò ). This has led us to analyze the following construction, which is a special case of the OAEP construction with Ò , and À being the identity function. Ù ´Öµ¨Ü (7) Ø ×¨Ö (8) where ¼ ½ ¼ ½ . Thus, Ì´Ü Öµ ´Öµ¨Ü ´ ´Öµ¨Öµ¨Ü , and the inverse is Á´Ù Øµ Ù¨ ´Ù¨Øµ. Thus, it suffices to show security when we either know Ø completely and miss bits of Ù, or when we know Ù completely and miss bits of Ø. Hence, it suffices to assume that Ä and consider the two cases separately. Ö℄ Ä ´ ´Öµ¨Öµ Ö℄ Ä ´ ´Öµ¨Öµ¨ The result now follows from the fact that´ ´Öµ¨Öµ is -ERF and Lemma 2.1. 2) Ä Ä ¾ . The proof is identical to above with the roles of ´Öµ and´ ´Öµ¨Öµ interchanged. In particular, security follows from the fact that ´Öµ is -ERF.
